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Summary
Increasingly, and particularly in response to the recent economic downturn, policy makers have pointed to
regulation as a “job killer” and have called for regulatory reform to promote job creation and economic
recovery. The empirical research, although limited, reveals a more complex relationship between
regulation and jobs, and fails to support the notion that regulation is either a major job killer or a
significant job creator. U.S. policy makers should not expect that the nation’s economic woes can be
solved by reforming the regulatory process.
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Regulation and Unemployment
Cary Coglianese
Over the last four years, the United States has endured one
of the most sustained periods of high unemployment in the
nation’s history.
As millions of Americans continue to search
for work, many political leaders have identified regulation as a substantial impediment
to economic recovery. Each year, federal
regulatory agencies issue approximately
4,000 rules that collectively impose tens of
billions of dollars in costs on industry.1 In
addition, the recently adopted Affordable
Care Act and Dodd-Frank Act call upon
federal agencies to adopt hundreds of additional regulations which will impose new
burdens on the economy.
Although Republican politicians have
been the most strident in characterizing
regulations as “job-killers” and in urging the
relaxation of certain regulatory controls on
industry, even Democratic President Obama
has spoken of the economic “chilling
effect” of regulations and has taken steps to
encourage regulators to consider effects on
employment when making decisions.2 Yet
despite how clearly regulation and employment have become linked in the minds
of many political leaders, what we know

empirically about the relationship between
jobs and regulation provides much less
reason to expect that the United States’ economic woes can be solved by simply reforming the regulatory process. To shed light on
the contemporary debate over regulatory
reform, this policy brief highlights findings
from empirical research on the connection
between regulation and jobs while considering possible avenues for future analysis of
the employment effects of new regulations.

The Jobs-Regulations Debate
The connection that politicians have drawn
between regulation and employment
extends back at least several decades. When
Ronald Reagan was running for President
in 1980, for example, he criticized the
Carter Administration for its “continuing
devotion to job-killing regulation” of the
struggling U.S. auto industry.3 Since 2009,
use of the phrase “job-killing regulation” by
politicians has skyrocketed and the linkage
between jobs and regulation has forged itself
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more deeply in political discourse. Figure
1 shows how the word “regulation” has
been increasingly accompanied by “jobs” or
“employment” in national newspapers over
the last ten years, following a trend that
appears closely related to increasing rates of
unemployment.
Responding to the recent economic
downturn, policymakers in the White
House and halls of Congress have urged
policy action to address the effects of
regulation on employment. In January 2011,
President Obama issued an executive order
expressly affirming that regulation needs
to deliver benefits while at the same time
“promoting economic growth…and job creation.” That order also calls on agencies to
review their existing regulations and change
or repeal those that have become “excessively burdensome.”4 A year later, the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness
issued a series of policy recommendations to
accelerate employment, with regulatory process and analysis reforms included among
the Council’s major proposals.5 In May
2012, President Obama issued yet another
executive order that directed agencies to “be
especially careful not to impose unjustified
regulatory requirements.”6
In Congress, numerous bills have been
introduced that would reform the regulatory process in the name of job creation.7
The House approved one bill in December
2011 that would have imposed on regulatory agencies a requirement to consider
“estimated impacts on jobs (including an
estimate of the net gain or loss in domestic
jobs)” in advance of issuing new regulations.8 In August 2012, the House adopted
another bill that would have affirmatively barred agencies from adopting any
costly new regulations until the national
unemployment rate dropped to below six
percent.9
Most of these recent regulatory reform
proposals have been based on an assumption
that regulation hampers job growth. Yet at
the same time, it remains widely accepted
1		Office

of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Draft 2012 Report to Congress on the Benefits
and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local, and Tribal Entities, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/omb/oira/draft_2012_cost_benefit_report.
pdf (2012).

2		Barack

that at least some regulations help foster
conditions that promote economic growth.
Even the recent Republican Presidential
candidate, Mitt Romney, noted that “regulation is essential [and] you can’t have a free
market work if you don’t have regulation.”10
Many defenders of stringent regulation go
Figure 1:

it remains comparatively limited. Since
1993, federal agencies have been required
by executive order to predict how major
new regulations would adversely impact
the economy, including specifically making
assessments of potential effects on employment.12 However, in few instances have
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still further to claim that the imposition
of additional regulatory controls would,
far from killing jobs, actually promote job
expansion. Environmental advocates point
to “green jobs” created by stringent environmental regulation, namely increased
employment at firms in the alternative
energy or pollution control sectors. Speaking at the 2012 Democratic National
Convention, former President Bill Clinton
claimed that new federal fuel economy standards would generate over 500,000 “good
new jobs” over the next two decades.11

What the Research Shows
Is regulation a job creator or a job killer?
Although this question has garnered
heightened political salience, the empirical research evidence needed to answer

Obama, “Toward a 21st-Century Regulatory System,” Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18,
2011, p. A17.
3		Lou Cannon, “Reagan, Ignoring Bush, Assails
Carter’s Policies,” Washington Post, May 19,
1980, p. A8.
4		Exec. Order No. 13,563, http://www.gpo.gov/

agencies monetized the value of job impacts
for inclusion in their prospective economic
analyses of regulations. Agencies have made
even fewer attempts, after adopting and
implementing rules, to evaluate employment
effects retrospectively.
For decades, economists tended to
ignore job impacts when analyzing regulations, due to an assumption that any such
effects would be transitory and relatively
minor. After all, economically efficient
regulation seeks to correct market failures
and maximize net benefits—not maximize
jobs. However, in recent years, research has
documented demonstrable negative effects
to individuals and families from unemployment. Especially when workers lose jobs in
mass layoffs or in periods of high unemployment, they can expect to re-enter the labor

fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-01-21/pdf/2011-1385.pdf
(2011).
5		President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness, Road Map to Renewal, http://
files.jobs-council.com/files/2012/01/
JobsCouncil_2011YearEndReport1.pdf (2011).
6		Exec. Order No. 13,610, http://www.gpo.gov/

fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-05-14/pdf/2012-11798.
pdf (2012).
7		Brian Hunt, “Regulatory Reform in Congress,”
RegBlog, Jan. 17, 2012, https://www.law.
upenn.edu/blogs/regblog/2012/01/regulatory-reform-in-congress-part-i.html (2012).
8		Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011, H.R.

table 1:

summary of principal studies on regulation and employment

Study	regulation

unit of analysis	time period	findings

Berman & Bui
(2001)

Local air quality regulations in
Southern California

Manufacturing firms

Morgenstern,
Pizer & Shih
(2002)

All environmental regulations
(as measured by industryreported spending on
environmental compliance)

Firms in pulp and
1979-1991
paper, plastics		
petroleum refining		
and iron and steel		

No statistically significant changes in jobs on
average across all four sectors, but small,
statistically significant increases in jobs in plastics
and petroleum sectors

Greenstone
(2002)

Federal and state air pollution
requirements imposed due to
nonattainment status under
Clean Air Act

Manufacturing
1972-1987
firms		

Average decrease in 40,000 jobs per year in
nonattainment areas relative to attainment areas

Walker (2012)

Federal and state air pollution
Workers in polluting
1990-2002
requirements imposed due to
sectors		
nonattainment status under			
Clean Air Act		

market having lost substantial earnings
power.13 Job losses have also been found to
be associated with an increase in psychological stress, morbidity, and mortality.14 These
consequential effects of unemployment help
explain why jobs have figured centrally in
the political debate over regulation, and why
they should garner more attention from
economists and other policy analysts.
Just as reflected in the political debate
over regulations as job-creators versus jobkillers, economic theory predicts that regulation could affect employment in different
ways.15 First, regulation could increase the
overall costs of all the inputs associated with
a regulated activity, including labor, such
that to continue producing at the same level,
firms would need both more capital and
more workers, thus encouraging employment. Second, regulation could increase
the costs of regulated goods or services,
leading to higher prices and correspondingly
reduced sales—and thereby leading firms
to need fewer workers. Finally, regulation
might change the mix of labor and capital
through the introduction of new technologies, and that change could either increase
or decrease the amount of labor required for

3010, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS112hr3010eh/pdf/BILLS-112hr3010eh.pdf.
9		Red Tape Reduction and Small Business Job
Creation Act, H.R. 4078, http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr4078eh/pdf/BILLS112hr4078eh.pdf.
10		 David Lauter, “Mitt Romney Makes Smooth

1979-1992

a given unit of output.
With no compelling theoretical reason
to expect regulation will result in overall
job losses or gains, the issue becomes an
empirical one. It is possible, after all, for
any given regulation to have a positive or
negative net impact on job levels within a
particular regulated sector, and possible too
for regulation overall to stimulate jobs just
as it reduces them.
What does the empirical evidence show?
Only a few published studies have rigorously examined whether regulation overall
leads to systemic changes in employment,
mainly in the context of environmental
regulation (Table 1). In one of the earliest
studies, economists Eli Berman and Linda
Bui analyzed manufacturing job effects
associated with local air pollution regulations adopted in Southern California.16
Comparing employment in that region over
time as well as in comparable firms outside
of Southern California, Berman and Bui
found no substantive or statistically significant effects of local air pollution regulations
on employment.
Richard Morgenstern and his colleagues
also evaluated whether reported spending

Shift to Center in Debate with Obama,” Los
Angeles Times, October 4, 2012, http://articles.
latimes.com/2012/oct/04/nation/la-na-debateanalysis-20121004.
11		 “Transcript of Bill Clinton’s Speech to the
Democratic National Convention,” New York
Times, Sept. 5, 2012, http://www.nytimes.

No statistically significant changes in jobs

At most a 0.7 percent decrease in employment
and a 23 percent reduction in present value of
workers’ wages

by businesses to comply with all natural
environmental regulations correlated with
changes in employment levels across those
firms, again finding no substantively or
statistically significant changes in the four
industrial sectors examined in the period
1979-1991. However, when analyzed
separately, two of these four sectors actually showed small, statistically significant
increases in jobs in the face of increased
regulatory compliance spending.17
By contrast, economist Michael
Greenstone found a decrease of an average
of about 40,000 jobs per year in facilities
located in areas of the country declared to
have “dirty” air and made subject to more
stringent air pollution requirements under
the Clean Air Act.18 However, because the
differences in Greenstone’s study were relative ones—that is, derived from a comparison with areas in the country lacking the
more stringent controls—it is not known
how much of the decrease reflected true
job “losses” rather than a shift in jobs from
dirtier areas of the country to cleaner ones.
Such a shift may even occur across facilities
owned by the same firm but located in different parts of the country.

com/2012/09/05/us/politics/transcript-of-billclintons-speech-to-the-democratic-nationalconvention.html.
12		 Exec. Order No. 12,866, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/
eo12866/eo12866_10041993.pdf (1993).
13		 Steven J. Davis and Till Von Wachter, “Reces-

sions and the Costs of Job Loss,” Brookings Pap.
Econ. Act., Fall 2011.
14		 Daniel Sullivan and Till von Wachter, “Job
Displacement and Mortality: An Analysis Using
Administrative Data,” Q. J. Econ. 124 (2009):
1265.
15		 Richard D. Morgenstern, William A. Pizer and

A more recent, unpublished paper also
reports changes in employment arising with
regulatory differences associated with the
Clean Air Act’s air quality designations.
Reed Walker tracked workers over time and
compared wage differences in cleaner (less
regulated) versus dirtier (more regulated)
areas of the country. He found that, in the
five years following the imposition of new
regulatory standards, overall employment
in the more stringently regulated areas fell
by at most about 0.7 percent and workers in
polluting sectors saw on average a 23 percent reduction in the present value of their
wages following new regulatory controls.19
Considered today, the mixed findings
across the existing studies appear difficult
to reconcile, but at a minimum they suggest
that the relationship between regulation
and jobs is more complex than portrayed
by either of the polar extremes expressed in
political discourse. Undoubtedly, regulation
does sometimes lead to some workers being
laid off due to plant closures or slowdowns,
but also it is certainly true that workers
are sometimes hired to install and run new
technologies or processes needed to comply
with new regulations. More importantly,
the research reveals that even if these losses
and gains sometimes cancel themselves out
when tallying aggregate impacts, regulation still can create consequences associated with job shifts. Job shifts can occur as
workers move to new facilities or assume
new responsibilities within the same firms,
as well as when they take on new jobs in
altogether different firms. The transitional
and permanent wage effects associated with
job shifts, as well as losses and gains, cannot
be ignored if researchers and regulators
are to assess fully how regulation affects
employment.

Directions for Future Analysis
Although more research is needed, it is clear
that the empirical research to date fails to
support any strong view that regulation is

Jhih-Shyang Shih, “Jobs Versus the Environment: An Industry-Level Perspective,” J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 43 (2002): 412.
16		 Eli Berman and Linda T. M. Bui, “Environmental
Regulation and Labor Demand: Evidence from
the South Coast Air Basin,” J. Public Econ. 79
(2001): 265.

17		 Morgenstern,

either a major job killer or a significant job
creator. It may be that the heterogeneous
nature of regulations (e.g., in what they
require, who they burden), as well as the
varied market conditions they affect, will
make it difficult ever to generalize broadly
about the job impacts of regulation per
se. A better approach may be to improve
the analysis of discrete regulations rather
than regulation writ large. The effect of any
individual new regulation on employment,
after all, could vary substantially depending
on the net costs the regulation imposes on
firms, the degree to which compliance with
the regulation will require new labor inputs,
the competitiveness of the affected industry,
the extent to which all or only some firms
in the relevant market are regulated, and the
price elasticity of consumer demand for the
affected products or services.

The relationship between
regulation and jobs is more
complex than portrayed in
political discourse.
The fact that some individual regulations
may have meaningful localized effects—and
that some regulations will have greater jobrelated impacts than others—reinforces the
importance of agencies developing better
estimates of job impacts before adopting
new regulations. Few would disagree that,
all other things being equal, it would be
better to adopt those regulations with fewer
negative employment effects. Of course, in
many cases, taking better account of job
impacts may have no bearing on the ultimate regulatory decision. For example, Reed
Walker found that even adding his estimates
of workers’ decreased wages to the costs of
air pollution regulation did not substantially
affect the positive net benefits attributable

Richard D., William A. Pizer &
Jhih-Shyang Shih, “Jobs Versus the Environment: An Industry-Level Perspective,” J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 43 (2002): 412.
18		 Michael Greenstone, “The Impacts of Environmental Regulations on Industrial Activity:
Evidence from the 1970 and 1977 Clean Air

to these rules. Nevertheless, on some occasions, adding wage or welfare effects from
unemployment might affect agency decision
making about whether or how to regulate.20
If agencies are to incorporate job impacts
more fully into their future regulatory
impact analyses, they will need to be able to
make more reliable predictions of changes
in employment likely to be affected by a
proposed regulation, and then place a monetary value on those changes to put them on
the same plane as other predicted effects of
the rule. To meet these analytic challenges,
agencies will need to go beyond the existing
empirical literature, gathering new data and
conducting additional analyses. Not only
are the results from existing studies mixed,
but these studies are limited in the number
of sectors and fields of regulation analyzed.
Furthermore, the data used in most of these
studies are now more than a decade old,
before what has arguably become a new
era of global economic competition—and
certainly well before the major economic
meltdown of the last few years. Both of
these factors potentially could affect some of
regulation’s impacts on jobs.
Of course, recent changes in economic
conditions—whether due to globalization
or the economic crisis—suggest a further
difficulty that agencies must overcome when
trying to predict reliably the employment
effects of proposed regulations in a dynamic
economy. Agencies sometimes adopt rules
that take legal effect up to a year or more
later, and perhaps up to several years after
the agency would have started to develop its
internal regulatory impact analysis, a period
of time that probably stretches the limits of
macroeconomic forecasting. To the extent
that negative employment impacts from a
regulation matter most in sustained periods
of high unemployment, it will be difficult
for regulators in advance to identify any of
those periods when they are contemplating
adoption of a rule intended to endure for
years if not decades.

Act Amendments and the Census of Manufactures,” J. Polit. Econ. 110 (2002): 1175.
19		 W. Reed Walker, “The Transitional Costs of
Sectoral Reallocation: Evidence from the Clean
Air Act and the Workforce,” US Census Bureau
Center for Economic Studies Paper No. CESWP 12-02, January 2012.

20		 Jonathan

S. Masur and Eric A. Posner, “Regulation, Unemployment, and Cost-Benefit Analysis,” Va. L. Rev. 98 (2012): 579.

Conclusion
The current period of high unemployment
in the United States has focused the policy
spotlight on the relationship between regulation and jobs. A number of administrative
and legislative reform proposals have been
premised on the view that regulation hinders job creation, although some advocates
claim that stringent regulation can actually
stimulate new jobs. This policy brief has
reviewed the limited research to date on the
connection between regulation and employment, finding that it does not support any
strong claim that regulation in general
has much of an impact on overall levels of
employment, in one direction or the other.

However, some regulations may still
have localized effects on employment, some
positive and some negative. These localized effects will continue to concern elected
politicians who naturally respond to the
needs and concerns of their local constituents. As a result, to help inform regulatory
decision making about potential localized
employment effects, government agencies
should expand and improve their analysis
of the relationship between rules and jobs.
Based on the existing empirical evidence,
however, neither regulators nor politicians
should expect that economic recovery for
the nation as a whole can be secured simply
by writing—or re-writing—rules.

brief in brief
• Increasingly, and particularly in response
to the recent economic downturn, policy
makers have pointed to regulation as a
“job killer” and have called for regulatory reform to promote job creation and
economic recovery.
• The empirical research, although limited,
reveals a more complex relationship
between regulation and jobs, and fails
to support the notion that regulation is
either a major job killer or a significant job
creator.
• To better understand the effects of regulation on jobs, government agencies need to
gather new and more current data, looking
at a wider variety of industry sectors.
• Based on the existing empirical evidence,
U.S. policy makers should not expect that
the nation’s economic woes can be solved
by reforming the regulatory process.
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